The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 9
Issue 3 Fall 2004

Article 4

December 2004

The Staging of Venture Equity Capital and Venture Capitalist
Bargaining Power
G. Geoffrey Booth
Michigan State University

Orkunt M. Dalgic
State University of New York at New Paltz

Allan Young
Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia & Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef

Recommended Citation
Booth, G. Geoffrey; Dalgic, Orkunt M.; and Young, Allan (2004) "The Staging of Venture Equity Capital and
Venture Capitalist Bargaining Power," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance and Business Ventures: Vol. 9:
Iss. 3, pp. 29-40.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.57229/2373-1761.1063
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol9/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at
Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

The Staging of Venture Equity Capital and Venture
Capitalist Bargaining Power
G. Geoffrey Booth*
Michigan State University,
Orkunt Dalgic**
State University of New York at New Paltz
and
Allan Young***
Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia &
Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University
In this paper we look at the effects of bargaining power on the types of entrepreneurial
projects chosen by venture capitalists and show that a wealth-constrained venture capitalist
prefers to provide equity financing to a two-stage rather than to a similar single-stage project.
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While the venture capitalist does not have bargaining power over the entrepreneur of a singlestage project and is thus unable to extract any surplus, the venture capitalist does have this
advantage in a two-stage project and, provided the project is good, can demand a portion of the
surplus as a pre-condition for providing follow-on capital. This suggests that venture capitalists
should stage their capital investments in order to improve their bargaining power, allowing
them to earn greater profits from successful entrepreneurial projects.
I.

Introduction
Venture capital financing has received a great deal of attention lately from both
empirical and theoretical researchers. But what is venture capital financing, and more
specifically, what do venture capitalists do? Barry (1994) suggests that “...venture capitalists
seek out promising ventures, eventually placing money in risky ventures managed by
entrepreneurs with unknown skills and unpredictable future efforts. Such investments are often
made in firms that have yet to register any revenue.” It is perhaps due to these risks that
venture capitalists tend to stage their capital investments. Sahlman (1988, 1990) shows that by
staging capital to an entrepreneurial project, a venture capitalist is able to create an
abandonment option that leads to an increase in the value of the investment. Admati and
Pfleiderer (1994) find that the abandonment option may be valuable because entrepreneurs
always prefer to continue bad projects as long as others finance them. In the same vein,
Gompers (1995) demonstrates how staging can solve agency problems and create strategic
options for the venture capitalist. Neher (1999) shows that by slowly transforming the human
capital of the entrepreneur to tangible or „fixed‟ capital, staging can reduce asymmetric
information problems related to the venture, and make it easier for the entrepreneur to obtain
outside financing. Studies have also found that staging capital can reduce moral hazard, i.e.
make the entrepreneur exert greater effort, by allowing the venture capitalist to learn the value
of the project incrementally in each project stage (e.g., Bergemann and Hege 1998; Noldeke
and Schmidt 1998), and by giving the venture capitalist the ability to deny follow-on financing
(e.g. Neher 1996; Landier 2002). Bergemann and Hege (1999, 2000) study the optimal
compensation for the entrepreneur in a dynamic (staged) model, where the allocation of funds
and the learning process are subject to moral hazard. Trester (1998) considers the problem of
asymmetric information and compares the incentives of the entrepreneur to steal from the
project under venture capitalist supplied preferred equity and debt financing.
In this paper, we examine how bargaining power affects the venture capitalist‟s decision
to stage equity capital. We find that venture capitalists have greater bargaining power when
equity capital is provided in two (or more) stages, allowing them to extract greater rents from
profitable projects. Thus, venture capitalists may prefer to stage capital because of the superior
bargaining position this provides them. We examine the effects of bargaining power on the exante incentives of a wealth-constrained venture capitalist for providing equity financing to an
entrepreneurial project. The models that we use herein, while similar in intuition to those
developed by Rajan (1992) in his analysis of the well-known bank “hold-up” problem, are
adapted to suit equity contracts. We also analyze the effects of constraining the initial wealth
of the venture capitalist on the choice of projects.1
1

Constraints of time (and initial wealth) lead the venture capitalist to consider only the highest marginal return
project(s) available to her. Furthermore, it is assumed that she has sufficient initial wealth to finance these
marginal project(s) without additional external borrowing.
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The first equity-financing model involves a project that requires a single investment at
time 0 with a payoff at time 2. The contract, signed at time 0, gives the venture capitalist an
equity share of the project payoff. The second financing model involves the staging of capital
over two time periods. Initially, a wealth-constrained entrepreneur offers a venture capitalist an
equity share of the proceeds from an entrepreneurial investment opportunity (a two-stage
project), in return for funding at time 0 and additional funding one period later. The project
may be of either good or bad quality, but this quality is not observable by either the venture
capitalist or the entrepreneur when the first stage of the investment is made by the venture
capitalist. At time 1, both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist know the project‟s quality
with certainty. The venture capitalist pursues the project, making a second-round investment if
the project‟s quality is good, or does not pursue the project, by refusing to fund its second stage
if the project‟s quality is bad. The one-stage model differs from the two-stage model in that no
contractible interim information is available to the venture capitalist about project quality.
Nevertheless, even if such information were available, because the contract involves equity, the
venture capitalist is not able to liquidate the project at time 1, even if the project is a bad one.2
The inability to liquidate is a major difference between Rajan‟s (1992) framework and ours.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews some of the important
literature in the area of venture capital financing. Section III sets up a model for a one-stage
entrepreneurial project. Section IV considers a model for a two-stage entrepreneurial project.
Section V examines the effect of bargaining power on the division of the surplus between the
entrepreneur and venture capitalist in the two models presented in the previous sections.
Section VI examines the effects endowment constraints of the venture capitalist have on her
choice of entrepreneurial projects. Finally, Section VII provides some concluding remarks.
II.

Literature Review
Much of the theory on venture capital looks at moral hazard problems where the
entrepreneur has private information about the project‟s cash flows and may therefore have
incentives to expropriate its funds. Trester (1998) considers the problem of asymmetric
information and compares the incentives of the entrepreneur to steal from the project under
venture capitalist supplied preferred equity and debt financing. He finds that when costly
auditing is not possible, debt financing is not feasible because it gives the venture capitalist a
foreclosure option that provides an incentive to the entrepreneur to cheat, thus reducing the exante compensation schedule for a risk-neutral entrepreneur. On the other hand, the
entrepreneur‟s own capital investment in the venture makes the risk-averse venture capitalist
more optimistic about its ex-ante returns and, therefore, more willing to commit equity
financing. Casamatta (2003) looks at the joint provision of effort by an entrepreneur and an
advisor to enhance the productivity of a project. In a moral hazard setting, she finds that when
the entrepreneur‟s effort is more efficient (less costly) than the advisor‟s effort, the advisor is
hired only if she provides financing for the project. However, without moral hazard, it is
optimal that both the entrepreneur and the advisor exert maximal effort on the project‟s behalf.
Bergemann and Hege (1998) examine venture capital financing in a dynamic agency setting.
They find that the allocation of funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard and
derive the optimal equity contract, which provides inter-temporal risk sharing between the
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist.
2

This is true even if a signal of project quality became available at time 1.
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Some moral hazard problems can be solved with the use of convertible securities.
Schmidt (2003) explains that by endogenously allocating cash flow rights (i.e. depending on
the state of the world and the entrepreneur‟s effort), convertible securities can be employed to
induce the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist to invest efficiently in the project. Cornelli
and Yosha (2003) examine how convertible securities can reduce the incentive of the venture
capitalist, created by the abandonment option, to engage in short-term “window-dressing”.
Studies of the incentives of venture capitalists to engage in value reducing behavior
have concentrated on the premature abandonment decision. Sahlman (1990) argues that
premature abandonment (through an IPO) may come about due to the fact that the venture
capitalist holds a more diversified portfolio of opportunities and has a higher opportunity cost
of time (as more profitable ventures become available) than the entrepreneur. According to
Gompers (1996), the venture capitalist may also bring about a premature IPO in order to both
signal her reputation and cause a revision of the market value of their investments, thereby
satisfying venture capital investors. Furthermore, as the empirical study of Chevalier and
Ellison (1995) documents, a premature IPO helps the venture capitalist attract new investment
capital.
Finally, Hellman (2002), while noting that some venture capitalists seek purely
financial gains as opposed to others who invest in order to achieve strategic objectives,
examines a model where strategic investors can achieve synergies, but can also incur a conflict
of interest with the entrepreneur. He also explains why a strategic investor often pays a price
based upon a higher valuation for participation in the project than does an independent venture
capitalist.
III.

A One-Stage Entrepreneurial Project
In this model, an entrepreneurial opportunity requiring single-stage funding presents
itself to the venture capitalist at time 0. The project requires an investment level I0b, and leads
to a certain payoff X2 at time 2. The rationality constraint for the venture capitalist at time 0 is
therefore:

bX2 – I0b  0,
where the venture capitalist receives a fraction, b, of the project payoff at date 2. The
entrepreneur who owns this project receives as compensation:
(1-b)X2  0,
which is always satisfied regardless of who gets the surplus. For example: if X2 = 2 and I0b = 1,
then  b  0.5 .
Thus, in a perfectly competitive market for venture capital, this entrepreneur captures
the entire surplus of the project, making the rationality constraint of the venture capitalist (see
above) hold with equality. We have assumed the reservation utilities of the entrepreneur to be
equal to zero at time 0 and also at time 1. As the effort of the entrepreneur is assumed not to
affect the success of the project, the cost of this effort is also assumed to be equal to zero for
the entrepreneur, with no loss of generality.
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IV.

A Two-Stage Entrepreneurial Project
In this, the two-stage financing model, a venture capitalist contracts with an
entrepreneur for a fraction of equity a, in return for I0a of initial financing and a level of
financing I1a at time 1 conditional on the quality of the project being good. The venture
capitalist receives a noiseless signal of project quality at time 1. With probability „p‟, the
project is of good quality, in which case the project payoff is S2H (=S2). With probability (1-p),
the project is of bad quality, in which case the payoff is S2L (=0, with no loss of generality).
Therefore, the venture capitalist does not provide second-stage financing to the entrepreneur if
the signal is bad. However, in order to undertake the project, the venture capitalist expects to
break even ex-ante:
pS2a 

I0a + pI1a

(holds with equality in equilibrium),

provided that K  I0a + I1a, where K is the initial endowment of the venture capitalist. Hence,
this condition implies that the venture capitalist has sufficient capital endowment to pursue the
two-stage project successfully. Consequently, the rationality condition of the entrepreneur is:
p(1-a)S2  0.
To simplify the exposition, we assume the reservation utilities of the entrepreneur at time 0 and
at time 1 to be zero. We further assume, as in the one-stage project in the previous section, that
effort is costless to the entrepreneur. Hence, the entrepreneur always wants to pursue the
project.
We must also consider the incentive compatibility of the venture capitalist at time 1.
Given that the venture capitalist receives a favorable signal of project quality, she makes an
additional investment, I1a, in the entrepreneurial firm, because:
S2a – I1a  0

(if project is of good quality).

The rationality condition of the entrepreneur is:
(1-a)S2  0

(if project is of good quality)

(1-a) 0  0

(if project is of bad quality).

and

Hence, the entrepreneur wants to continue the project at time 1 even if the project is of bad
quality. For example: If S2 = 2, and I1a = 1, then  a  0.5 .
V.

The Effects of Bargaining Power
In the previous sections, we did not explicitly address the issue of the bargaining power
of the venture capitalist. If we assume that entrepreneurs have all of the bargaining power at all
stages of their respective projects, then the venture capitalist makes zero profits in equilibrium
regardless of whether he chooses the single-stage or the two-stage project. Let us suppose,
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however, that at time 1, the entrepreneur of the two-stage project is able to obtain alternate
financing from an outside venture capitalist. The signal of project quality is assumed to be
available only to the inside venture capitalist at time 1, since learning this information required
an initial investment of I0a by the inside venture capitalist. Therefore, the original venture
capitalist knows the quality of the project with certainty at time 1, whereas the outside venture
capitalist has a conjectured probability of the project being of good quality.
Thus, the rationality constraint at time 1 for the inside venture capitalist when the
project is of good quality, is:

aS2 – I1a  0,

(if project is of good quality)

whereas for an outside venture capitalist, the rationality constraint at time 1 is:
q(1-a)bS2 + (1-q)(1-a)b0 – I1a  0,
which reduces to:
q(1-a)cS2 – I1a  0,3
where q  [0, 1] is the conjectured probability by the outside venture capitalist that the project
is of the good type, given that the entrepreneur is looking for outside venture capital financing
at time 1, and c is the share of the project payoff the external venture capitalist requires in
order to provide funds to the project.
Now, we can find the limits of the conjectured probability of the outside venture
capitalist in equilibrium:
q = Prob(Project = Good | Seeks Capital From Outside Venture Capitalist).
We denote this as q = P(G|SCFOC). Using Bayes‟ rule:
P(SCFOC | G)  P(G)
q  P(G|SCFOC) 
,
P(SCFOC | G)  P(G)  P(SCFOC | B)  P(B)
where P(B) is the ex-ante probability that the project is bad, and P(G) is the ex-ante probability
that the project is good. Next, we can substitute p for P(G) and (1-p) for P(B). The term
P(SCFOC | B) is the probability that the entrepreneur looks for external funding at time 1 given
that the project is bad. We already know that the entrepreneur always wishes to continue the
project (i.e., regardless of project quality), and that when the project quality is bad, the inside
venture capitalist always refuses to commit any funds to the project at time 1. Thus, we
conclude that in equilibrium P(SCFOC | B) is equal to 1. What about P(SCFOC | G)? Short of
finding a Nash equilibrium for this game, we can say that in equilibrium, P(SCFOC | G) must
have a value between 0 and 1. Therefore, if we take P(SCFOC|G) = 0, we find that q = P(G |
SCFOC) = 0, and by taking P(SCFOC|G) = 1, we find q = p, meaning that in equilibrium q 

Note that at time 1, the entrepreneur owns only 1-a of the project, which she can offer the external venture
capitalist.
3
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[0, p]. The best the entrepreneur can hope for is that the external venture capitalist uses passive
conjectures (q = p < 1), in valuing her equity share of the project.
Therefore, combining the rationality conditions of the internal and external venture
capitalists (see above) gives the equilibrium result:

c > a.
Thus, the entrepreneur‟s good quality project would be undervalued by external venture
capitalists, meaning that the entrepreneur of a good quality project is worse off under an
external venture capitalist than under an internal venture capitalist. This would imply that the
internal venture capitalist has superior bargaining power than the entrepreneur in the case of the
good quality two-stage project. Although the internal venture capitalist always wants to fund
the good quality project in equilibrium, he also wants to extract some non-zero level of surplus
from the entrepreneur as a pre-condition for further funding. Thus, the venture capitalist can be
seen as using this discretion to „hold up‟ the entrepreneur of the two-stage project. Solving the
bargaining game, the entrepreneur gets (1-)(1-a)S2 ex-ante, while the internal venture
capitalist gets (1-a)S2 (excluding investment costs), where   (0,1) is the share of the
unallocated surplus the internal venture capitalist gets in return for the funds needed to continue
the project until time 2, namely, I1a. This is the same as in the short-term bank contract model
of Rajan (1992).
Taking into account the bargaining power of the venture capitalist, we find that the
expected return to the venture capitalist from undertaking the two-stage project at time 0 is:
p(1-a)S2 + pa S2 – I0a – pI1a.
This can be rearranged as:
((1-a) + a) pS2 – I0a – pI1a > 0,
which is strictly greater than zero in equilibrium, since  is strictly greater than zero.
It is easy to see that for the entrepreneur of the two-stage project, the time 0 rationality
constraint is satisfied regardless of her relative bargaining power (1-):
p(1-)(1-a)S2  0,

 . (0,1].

The entrepreneur, therefore, agrees to a contract in which she keeps none of the project surplus.
Our analysis in this section showed that the venture capitalist has greater bargaining
power than the entrepreneur of the two-stage project. In a single-stage project, venture
capitalists compete at date 0 only, since this is the only time when funding is required. Since
all venture capitalists are equally informed about the return on the project (i.e., that it returns X2
with certainty at time 2), venture capitalists do not have greater bargaining power than the
entrepreneurs in this type of project. Therefore, all venture capitalists providing funding to
one-stage projects expect just to break-even in equilibrium (i.e., the entrepreneur receives all of
the surplus). For example, if I0a = 1, and I1a = 1, p = 0.5, S2 = 3,  a  0.5, and   0.75 .
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VI.

Project Choice of an Endowment Constrained Venture Capitalist
We assume that K, the initial capital endowment of the venture capitalist is common
knowledge. Here, we consider the incentives for an endowment-constrained venture capitalist
of choosing either of the two entrepreneurial projects presented in the previous sections. The
first entrepreneurial firm requires a single-stage investment and the second a two-stage
investment by the venture capitalist. The time 0 rationality conditions for the venture capitalist
are as follows:
For taking the single-stage project:

bX2  I0b.
For taking the two-stage project:
paS2 + (1-p)a(0)  I0a + pI1a + (1-p)(0),
which implies that in equilibrium:
paS2 = I0a + pI1a.
Also, because of her relative bargaining position with respect to the entrepreneur of the
two-stage project, the venture capitalist receives an additional fraction of shares (1-a) at time
1 when the project is of good quality. Hence, the expected ex-ante profits of the venture
capitalist under the two-stage project are:
p(1-a)S2 + pa S2 – I0a – pI1a.
Meanwhile, the ex-ante rationality constraints for the two entrepreneurs are:
p(1-a)(1-)S2  0

(two-stage project)

(1-b)X2  0

(one-stage project),

which always holds in equilibrium, regardless of , a and b. Therefore, provided the initial
endowment, K, of the venture capitalist is sufficient (i.e., K  I0a + I1a + I0b), both of these
positive net present value projects would be financed by the venture capitalist because she
makes non-negative profits under each.
However, when the initial endowment of the venture capitalist, K, is limited (i.e., K <
I0a + I1a + I1b), then both projects cannot be pursued ex-ante, and one of the following occurs:
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If I0a + I1a  K < I0b, then in equilibrium only the two-stage project is taken ex-ante.



If I0b  K < I0a + I1a, then the venture capitalist has insufficient capital to fund the twostage project, given that it is of good quality. Therefore, in equilibrium, the venture
capitalist funds the single-stage project at time 0.



If K < I0a + I1a + I0b, but K  I0a + I1a and K  I0b, then the venture capitalist has
sufficient capital at date 0 to fund only one of the projects, but not both.

Because we are interested in studying the venture capitalist‟s choice between two
identical projects that differ only in how their investments are staged, we assume that K < I0a +
I1a + I0b, K  I0a + I1a and K  I0b, so that the venture capitalist‟s choice at time 0 is to fund
either the two-stage project or the single-stage project.
The ex-ante expected profit of the venture capitalist if the two-stage project is chosen at
time 0, is:
paS2 + p(1-a) S2 – I0a – pI1a > 0 (in equilibrium).
If the one-stage project is chosen at time 0, the venture capitalist‟s ex-ante profit is:

bX2 – I0b = 0 (in equilibrium).
Therefore, a wealth-constrained venture capitalist would choose to finance the two-stage
project as opposed to the one-stage project because her ex-ante profit is greater with the former
project.
VII.

Conclusion
In this paper we examined the project choice of a wealth-constrained venture capitalist.
We find that a wealth constrained risk neutral venture capitalist prefers to equity finance a
project where investment capital is committed to the project in two-stages, over a project where
the capital is committed in an initial lump sum. The reason for this preference stems from the
superior bargaining position the venture capitalist has relative to the entrepreneur in the case of
the two-stage project, which allows the venture capitalist to extract some of the project surplus.
Therefore, the staging of the equity capital improves the venture capitalist‟s bargaining
position, allowing her to benefit from the project at the expense of the entrepreneur.
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